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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Trial Court err in finding that the pickup truck 
owned by the Defendant was/;exempt from execution. 
2. Did the Trial Court err in finding that there was a levy 
pursuant to an execution prior to any sale of the truck by Walker. 
3. Did the Trial Court err in finding that Walker failed to 
transfer ownership of his truck as required by law prior to the 
levy of execution by the County Sheriff. 
4. Walker having failed to designate error on appeal as it 
related to the two "Cross Claim Defendants" is he now precluded 
from raising the issue upon appeal. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUSES 
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
Attached hereto as an addendum is a copy of the statutes that 
are determinative of the case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an action brought by RVA 
Realtors, aka, RVA Service Corporation against the 
Defendants/Appellants Ralph L. Walker and Marsha Walker for the 
collection of the sums due upon a delinquent promissory note. 
The Defendants Ralph L. Walker and Marsha Walker answered the 
complaint of the Plaintiff and filed a "Crossclaim" against the 
Respondents George W. Preston, Thomas L. Willmore and Credit 
Bureau of Logan. 
The "Crossclaim" alleged among other things that the 
Respondents conspired to deprive Walker of a truck that he had 
attempted to convey to Plaintiff in partial satisfaction of the 
Plaintiff's claim. Further alleged causes of action are inten-
tional interference with contracts relations, intentional inter-
ference with prospective economic advantage, trespass to chattels 
and conversion of chattels. 
B. Disposition in Trial Court. The Respondents filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment to dismiss the "Crossclaim" which was 
granted by the District Court of Cache County. From this judgment 
of dismissal the Defendant and Crossclaimant appeals. The trial 
in the matter of RVA Realtors, Plaintiff v. Ralph L. Walker and 
Marsha Walker has at the date hereof not proceeded to final 
judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Credit 3ureau of Logan obtained a judgment against Ralph 
L. Walker on the 20th day of May, 1985, for the sum of $1,858.25. 
Following the entry of judgment Walker failed to satisfy the 
judgment. The Credit 3ureau of Logan, on the 24th day of June, 
1385, obtained from the Clerk of the Circuit Court an execution 
which, together with a precipe Eor execution, was delivered to the 
Sheriff of Cache County. 
The day before the execution was served on Walker, James 
Wilson, the President of the Credit Bureau of Logan, Inc., had 
received from Walker a note (Record pg. 41) that stated as 
follows: 
"Mr. Wilson, I would trade either my truck or Jeep 
Cherokee for satisfaction of my obligation to Credit 
Bureau. If you are interested let me know". Ralph 
Walker 753-6110 (Emphasis added) 
On the 25th day of June, the Sheriff of Cache County con-
tacted the Defendant for the purpose of levying upon the pickup 
truck described in the precipe for execution. At that time 
Commercial Security Bank of Logan, Utah, held the certificate of 
title as security for the payment of an obligation upon the 
vehicle. (Record 51) Ralph L. Walker was the owner of the 
vehicle. (Record 43) 
The precipe directed to the Sheriff omitted the "LH" figure 
portion of the license number but contained the correct numerial 
designation of 2983. ^he Defendant's name was correctly spelled 
in the execution and in the title designation of the precipe but 
Ralph was spelled R-A-O-L-P-H in the body of the precipe. The 
serial number was at all times correctly described in the precipe. 
Deputy Sheriff Crockett served the execution on Walker on June 25, 
1985 at his office in Logan, Utah. Ralph Walker at that time 
promised to bring the pickup truck to the Cache County Sheriff's 
Office and leave it in the parking lot together with the keys for 
the truck. (Sheriff Crockett's Affidavit, Record pg. 50) Walker 
indicated to the Sheriff that he had a luncheon appointment and 
agreed to honor the levy immediately after the noon hour. 
(Crockett Affidavit, pg. 51) Following the noon hour, Deputy 
Crockett realized the truck was not in the Cache County Sheriff's 
parking lot as Mr. Walker had promised. He obtained a corrected 
precipe to himself, changing the misspelled "Ralph" and adding 
"LH" to the license number. He called Ralph Walker on the 
telephone, at that time the Deputy Sheriff was advised by Ralph 
Walker that he did not own the truck, that he had just sold the 
truck to Russell Anderson. (Record pg. 51) The deputy sheriff 
immediately went to Ralph Walker's office where Ralph Walker 
stated to him that he had sold the truck to Russell Anderson. 
(Crockett Affidavit, Record pg. 51) At that time Walker delivered 
to the Sheriff a copy of the Bill of Sale which he purportedly had 
negotiated during the noon hour to Russell Anderson. (Record pg. 
55) 
The Bill of Sale which Walker claims is entitled to make is 
to Russell V. Anderson. The Plaintiff in this action is RVA 
Realtors and RVA Realty Services Corporation. The debt that is 
owed by the Defendant Ralph Walker is owed to RVA Services and not 
Russell Anderson. 
Walker's Bill of Sale contains neither license number nor 
serial number to positively identify the vehicle, and is signed by 
Ralph Walker personally and as the president of RLW Development, 
Inc. (Crockett Affidavit, Record pg. 55) 
Ralph L. Walker did not execute an owner's transfer on the 
Utah Certificate of ^itle following the alleged sale. (Record pg. 
43) 
Deputy Crockett ultimately located the truck on July 17, 
1985, and took possession of the truck. Walker wrote to the pre-
sident of the Credit 3ureau as evidenced by a letter found on 
record (Record pg. 42) as follows: 
"Now that you have executed on my truck I have no choice 
but to file which I will do at the latest Monday after-
noon. I doubt that the truck will bring much of anything 
above what I owe which means I've got nothing and I lose 
$2,000.00 equity in the truck. If you want the truck and 
assume the loan at CSB you can have it, otherwise, I've 
got to file to protect my equity". RLW 
The affidavit of Russell V. Anderson of RVA Realtors, aka, 
RVA Service Corporation disclaimed any interest in the truck. 
(Record pg. 70 -71) 
Following the misrepresentation by Walker that he would 
deliver the truck to the Cache County Sheriff's Office, the 
Sheriff of Cache County located the truck parked at 52 North 1st 
East, Logan, Utah. Walker's license plates were attached to the 
truck and bore the designation LH 2983 which had been correctly 
set forth on the precipe. The vehicle identification number was 
checked at that time and was verified to be one and the same truck 
as registered to the name of Ralph Walker. (Crockett Affidavit) 
(Record pg. 57) There was no evidence of ownership about the 
vehicle other than that of Ralph L. Walker. (Record pg. 51 - 52) 
The Deputy Sheriff took the vehicle into his possession, noticed 
the vehicle for sale and sold the truck on August 9, 1985. 
(Record pg. 52) Ralph Walker was not present at the sale. The 
truck was sold for the sum of $129.75 subject, however, to the 
lien at Commercial Security Bank. (Record pg. 52 - 53) The 
complaint in this action was filed on the 25th day of June, 1985, 
which is the same day the Sheriff appeared at the office of Ralph 
Walker and levied on the vehicle. Walker was not served with the 
summons until after the levy by the Cache County Sheriff. At the 
date hereof no judgment has been entered in that case. 
Following the Sheriff's Sale upon the execution James H. 
Wilson of the Credit Bureau of Logan, Inc., obtained the cer-
tificate of title from Commercial Security Bank by paying the lien 
upon the vehicle. (Record pg. 39) 
The Credit Bureau of Loganf Inc., is represented by the firm 
of Harris, Preston, Gutke & Chambers, principally by George W. 
Preston. Thomas Willmore's only involvement was to conduct a 
supplemental proceeding after the vehicle was levied upon and 
prior to sale for the purpose of determining the ownership of the 
vehicle and the ownership of other property owned by Ralph L. 
Walker. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Standard of Review for Appeal of Summary Judgment. 
2. Plaintiff claims that his truck was exempt from execu-
tion. However, such claim is neither supported by the evidence 
nor the law. 
3. The Trial Court did not err in dismissing Walker's 
"Crossclaim" as a valid execution was issued by the Court and the 
Sheriff, in fact, levied upon the truck. 
4. Walker failed to consumate the sale pursuant to Utah Law 
and the levy was therefore valid. 
POINT I 
UNDER THE STANDARDS FOR REVIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENTS THE 
DEFENDANT, WALKER IS BARRED FROM INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL 
EVIDENCE AND RAISING ISSUES NOT1 PRESENTED BY HIS "CROSSCLAIM". 
This Courtfs inquiry on review is whether there is any 
genuine issue as to any material fact, if there is notf whether 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matterof law* 
Thornock v. Cooky Utah, 604 P.2d 934 (1979). 
To determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact the 
evidence introduced in the District Court is considered most 
favorable to Walker. Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., Utah, 
595 P.2d 526 (1979). 
Walker's pleading, (a cross claim) is in fact a third party 
complaint against new parties and is therefore in the nature of a 
complaint. This pleading fails to raise the issue of the exemp-
tion of the truck from execution. The pleading claims a sale to 
R.V.A. Realtors. (The bill of sale states the truck was sold to 
Russell v. Anderson an individual) 
The issues presented to the Trial Court were as follows: 
1. Did the Sheriff of Cache County levy on the Walker 
vehicle? 
2. Does the Bill of Sale executed by Walker to Russell v. 
Anderson constitute a valid transfer of ownership under Utah Law? 
The facts presented under the issues of this case are not in 
dispute. The Bill of Sale and its origin are not disputed. Its 
effectiveness as a means of transferring ownership is a matter of 
law. The facts concerning the levy of execution are not disputed. 
The effect of the levy is a matter of law. Deputy Crockett's ser-
vice of the Writ upon Walker and Walker's promise to bring the 
truck to the Cache County Sheriff's Office are really not in 
dispute. Walker does not dispute the fact that after the claimed 
transfer to Russell V. Anderson the car was located by Sheriff 
Crockett and taken into his possession. If in fact there was a 
failure to make a levy the first time Crockett visited Walker, 
Walker does not dispute the validity of the subsequent levy and 
Sheriff's Sale. 
The issue of the truck being exempt is not raised by Walker's 
pleadings and was only raised for the first time in his reply 
brief to the District Court. In the case of Bangerter v. Poulton, 
Utah, 663 P.2d 100 (1983) this Court said that: 
"(I)t is axiomatic that defenses and claims not 
raised by the parties in the trial cannot be 
considered for the first time on appeal". 
In Snyder v. Merkley, Utah, 693 P.2d 64 (1984) this Court 
held: 
"Summary judgment should be granted only if the 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions 
submitted in a case show that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It 
should be granted only when it clearly appears that 
there is no reasonable probability that the party 
moved against could prevail". 
If Walker's Bill of Sale cannot, by law, transfer title to 
Anderson, then the levy, regardless of when it occurred is lawful 
and Walker cannot prevail under any theory. If the Bill of Sale, 
under Utah law, is valid, then the issue of law is raised as to 
when the levy of execution occurred, before or after the sale of 
the truck. The effect of Walker's promise to deliver the car to 
the Sheriff's office is also a matter of law to be determined in 
conjunction with the first levy of execution. 
There is no genuine issue of fact presented by the Defendant, 
Walker. The Trial Court with the facts presented, correctly 
concluded as a matter of law that the levy on the truck was valid. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT, WALKER, CLAIMS HIS TRUCK WAS EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION. 
This issue was not pleaded in Walker's "Crossclaim" and was 
not addressed as an issue to the District Court. 
A review of the documents in evidence as attached to affida-
vits indicates that the day prior to the execution Walker wrote to 
Wilson of the Credit Bureau as follows: 
I would trade either my truck or Jeep Cherokee for 
satisfaction of my obligation to Credit Bureau. If you 
are interested let me know. Ralph L. Walker 753-6110 
(Emphasis Added.) 
The exemption statutes of the State of Utah as found in 
U.C.A. 78-23-8 as amended indicate as follows: 
(2) An individual is entitled to an exemption of 
implements, professional books, or tools of the trade 
of the individual, all having an aggregate value of 
not exceeding $1500.00; and one motor vehicle having 
a value not exceeding $1500.00 where such motor vehicle 
is used for the claimant's business or profession. 
Exhibit 1 attached to Walker's Brief is not in evidence and 
was not an exhibit before the District Court. 
Walker's letter (Record pg. 41, Addendum p. 1) states that 
Walker has two vehicles, a truck, which is the vehicle in question 
and a Jeep Cherokee. This letter is dated after the June 6th 
letter claiming an exemption, and refers to two vehicles. Walker, 
after the execution still owned a Jeep Cherokee. Sheriff 
Crockett's affidavit states that the Defendant did not appear at 
the sale for the purDosP n-p ~i -*-•--•-
The word "exemption" is defined in Section 78-23-2 as protec-
tion from subjection to a judicial process to collect an unsecured 
debt. The letter admitting ownership of two vehicles is incon-
sistent with his claim of exemption for two reasons: (a) If the 
Defendant has two vehicles only one may be exempt. The Defendant 
presumably still had a Jeep Cherokee to satisfy his exemption 
requirement. It is submitted that either vehicle executed upon by 
the Credit 3ureau would have invoked Walker's claim of exemption 
notwithstanding the fact that the other car remained in his 
possession, and (b) in his claim for exemption, Walker fails to 
define his business or profession. Walker failed either in 
writing or in person to set forth the "business or profession" for 
which the exemption was claimed. 
After the truck was noticed for sale, Walker again wrote to 
the President of the Credit Bureau indicating as follows: 
"Now that you have executed on m^ truck... " 
On one hand Walker claims to have sold the truck, while main-
taining after execution and notice of sale that his truck is 
exempt. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT CLAIMS THAT A LEVY DID NOT OCCUR ON JUNE 25, 
1985, BUT 22 DAYS AFTER WALKER HAD SOLD HIS TRUCK. 
A. Walker incorrectly assumes in his brief that the execu-
tion was faulty. 
The affidavit of Deputy Sheriff Crockett indicates that at 12 
o'clock on the 25th day of June, 1985, he served the execution on 
Ralph L. Walker and made the demand upon him for the Ford pickup 
truck. He further indicated that he levied upon the pickup truck 
by delivery to Ralph Walker a copy of the execution and precipe 
for execution. 
The only omission in the precipe was the letter designation 
"LH" of the license number. All other license numerals and the 
vehicle identification number were correctly set forth. 
Therefore, an immediate identification of the vehicle was 
possible. Upon receiving the levy Walker promised to bring the 
pickup truck pursuant to the levy to the Cache County Sheriff's 
Office and leave it in the parking lot. (Crockett Affidavit, 
Record pg. 50) 
A levy is defined in Section 78-23-1 as the "seizure of pro-
perty pursuant to any legal process issued for the purpose of 
collection of an unsecured debt". Many courts have defined the 
word "seizure". Generally it means to take into possession either 
actually or constructively. 33 C.J.S., Executions, 244. In the 
case of Brunswick Corporation v. Playmore Enterprises, Oregon, 452 
P. 2d 533 (1969) the court held as follows: 
To make a levy the statute cited above require that 
the sheriff must take the property into his possession 
or leave a certified copy of the Writ of Execution and 
notice specifying the property to be sold on execution 
with the person in possession. 
Sheriff Crockett's Affidavit, (Record pg. 50 - 52) states 
that the execution was served on Ralph L. Walker and demand made 
upon him for the Ford pickup. At that time Walker acknowledged 
the levy by promising to bring the pickup pursuant to the levy to 
the Cache County Sheriff's Office. It appears further from sub-
sequent events that the representation made by Walker was false 
and made for the purpose of inducing a sheriff into refraining 
from taking the property into possession until such time as the 
Defendant could make and execute a Bill of Sale, which was exhi-
bited to the Sheriff after the initial service of the execution 
upon Walker. Walker concedes in his affidavit at page 81 of the 
record as follows: 
I told him that if he possessed a writ with my truck 
identified I would cooperate with him and deliver the 
truck. 
The writ, in fact, described the truck by make, type, serial 
number and four numerals of the license number. The Defendant, by 
his own conduct acknowledged the levy upon the truck, although the 
truck was not in the presence of the Deputy or taken into physical 
possession by the Deputy. Reasonable and ordinary diligence is 
all that is required of a levying officer. See Mortensen v. 
Berzel Investments Co., Arizona, 410 P.2d 689 (1966) where the 
Arizona Court said as follows: 
Keeping in mind that appellants by their own declaration 
to the deputy failed to either cooperate with the levy 
by making known the existence of personal property on 
which execution might be taken or to avail themselves 
of the statutory right afforded to them to make such 
designation, we cannot but conclude that they are now 
barred by the legal procedures which they have made 
no effort to interrupt. Reasonable and ordinary 
diligence is all that is required of the levying 
officer. 
See further the case of Credit Bureau of Brokenbow Inc. v. 
Moninger, Nebraska, 284 N.W.2d 855 (1979), where the deputy 
serving a writ of execution announced to the judgment debtor as 
follows: 
"I execute on the pickup for the County of Custer". 
The deputy did not take the pickup into his possession. Three 
days later the judgment debtor and a bank executed a security 
agreement on the vehicle which was filed. Notation of the 
security interest was made on the title to the pickup that same 
day. 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in rendering a decision stated 
as follows: 
"A manual interference with chattels is not essential 
to a valid levy thereon. It is sufficient if the pro-
perty is present and subject for the time to the control 
of the officer holding the writ, and that he in express 
terms asserts his dominion over it by virtue of such 
writ. 
The bank would have us hold that the pickup should have 
been physically seized to make the levy valid. We do 
not believe that failure to take physical possession 
in this case goes to the validity of the levy. The 
deputy sheriff did all that was required by the laws 
of this state with regard to levying under a writ of 
execution. Whether or not the officer took physical 
possession after he levied relates to the ability of 
the officer to produce the property levied on, and to 
his possible civil liability for failure to do so, and 
to the validity of the levy. It is, of course, pos-
sible that the failure of a levying officer to protect 
and preserve the property levied upon might give rise 
to an action between the officer or his bonding company 
and the judgment creditor." 
See also Palais et al, v. DeJarnette et al, In Re 
Scharton- (s) Estate, Virginia, 145 Fed. Rep. F.2d 145 F.2d 953 
(1944). 
Further, by virtue of the consent of the debtor to the levy, 
the debtor is estopped to now claim the insufficiency of the levy. 
See 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Garnishment and Attachment, 777. 
"In this connection, however, it should be observed 
that a levy may be good as against the defendant in 
a writ when it would not be good as against third 
persons, this distinction being based not on any 
difference in the legal requisites of the levy, 
but on the fact that the conduct of the defendant, 
either by positive or negative acts, may amount to 
a wavier or an estoppel or agreement that that shall 
be a levy, which without such conduct would not be 
sufficient. As against the defendant, therefore, 
no great strictness of form is necessary; the levy 
on his property with his consent is sufficient. 
It is recognized that there is authority to the contrary, 
Belvin v. Beard, Georgia 49 S.E. 2d 546. 
B. Walker's purported sale of the vehicle was ineffectual. 
It is apparent that Walker's agreement to deliver the truck 
to the Cache County Sheriff was made for the purpose of buying 
time so that Walker could attempt to dispose of the vehicle. 
The Bill of Sale is ineffectual because it fails to conform 
with the statutes of the State of Utah relating to the transfer of 
title to vehicles. 
Walker claims the sale to Anderson to have taken place on the 
25th day of June. ^he Sheriff located the vehicle in a parking 
lot on the 17th day of July. Walker's letter to Wilson after the 
17th day of July commences with the statement as follows: 
"Now that you have executed on nr£ truck...." 
The Bill of Sale standing alone is not effective to transfer title 
to a vehicle in the State of Utah. See 41-1-62 U.C.A. where the 
owner is required to remove registration plates from a vehicle 
that has been sold. Also 41-1-63 U.C.A. where the owner is 
required to endorse an Assignment and Warranty of Title upon a 
valid Certificate of Title for the purpose of changing ownership. 
See further 41-1-64 U.C.A. where the new owner before operating 
the vehicle is required to return the Certificate of Registration 
and Title to the Department of Motor Vehicles and apply for a new 
certificate of title. 
Section 41-1-72 states that: 
Until the department shall have issued a new certificate 
of registration and certificate of ownership title shall 
not have passed to the new purchaser. (Addendum p. 1) 
At all times before, during and after the execution and sale 
the truck remained in the name of Ralph L. Walker. (Record pg. 
43) Therefore, assuming for the purpose of argument that the ini-
tial levy by the Sheriff is determined not to be a proper levy 
under present Utah Law. Certainly a levy occurred on the 17th of 
July, when the Sheriff had the truck towed away for storage 
pending sale. At that time Walker's license plates were still 
attached to the truck, the bank's certificate of title was not 
endorsed and there was no evidence of a change of ownership of the 
vehicle other than a mere bill of sale executed by Walker, which 
on its face fails to describe the license number or serial number. 
The facts of the case before the court show that Walker's 
purported sale of the vehicle was ineffectual as against the levy 
of execution by the Credit Bureau of Logan. The bill of sale 
served only to put the Credit Bureau and the Sheriff of Cache 
County on notice that Walker was attempting to convey the property 
and to exercise more diligence in determining whether a valid sale 
had taken place, andf thereforef the Sheriff's Deputy by his own 
affidavit was careful to determine that all indicia of: ownership 
reflected Walker's continued ownership of the vehicle at the time 
that he located the vehicle in the parking lot and at the time of 
sale. (See Record pg. 51 - 52) Reference Credit Bureau of 
Brokenbow, Inc. v. Moninger, Infra. Swartz v. White, Utah, 80 Ut. 
150, 13 P.2d 643, (1932); Jackson v. James, Utah, 97 Ut. 41 89 
P.2d 235 (1939). 
POINT IV 
WALKER CLAIMS HE HAD THE RIGHT ^0 CONVEY HIS TRUCK TO 
ANOTHER CREDITOR. 
These "Crossclaim Defendants" do not dispute the legal prin-
ciple which provides that a person has the right to apply his pro-
perty to the payment of some debts to the exclusion of other debts. 
However, Walker's attempted conveyance in this case was illusory 
by reason of the fact that he failed to conform the transfer of 
his interest to the statutes of the State of Utah. And, after the 
levy of execution and prior to the sale, Walker wrote to James 
Wilson of the Credit Bureau and admitting that the Credit 3ureau 
had executed on "his" truck. Such an admission is contrary to the 
position taken by Walker that he conveyed his interest in the 
truck to Anderson. Walker's conveyance was intended to hinder, 
delay, a judgment creditor. The promise made to the County 
Sheriff by Walker that he would deliver the truck to the Sheriff's 
Office was made for the purpose of preventing the Sheriff, at that 
time, from taking the truck into his possession. 
Anderson has never corroborated Walker's conveyance of the 
truck to him by claiming an interest in the truck, (Record pg. 47 
and 70) 
If Walker has suffered damages he must bear that respon-
sibility. It is his conduct and misrepresentation that have 
caused his damages, if any there might be. 
POINT V 
WALKER HAS FAILED TO DESIGNATE ANY POINTS ON APPEAL 
REGARDING PRESTON AND WILLMORE AND THEREFORE IT SHOULD 
BE CONCLUDED THAT THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT STANDS. 
Willmore's participation in this case was the conduct of a 
Supplemental Proceeding of Walker relative to his assets for the 
Credit Bureau of Logan, Inc. 
Preston's participation consisted of representing the Credit 
Bureau in obtaining the judgment and delivery of the execution to 
the Court to be issued and delivery of a precipe to the sheriff. 
All actions taken were in behalf of the Credit Bureau. 
Walker failed to file a docketing statement giving notice of 
any intent to appeal the dismissal of Preston and Willmore. 
His brief fails to cite any error of the Trial Court in 
dismissing Preston and Willmore as "Cross Claim Defendants". 
And, therefore, the dismissal should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Walkerfs Brief assumes that the Bill of Sale standing alone 
is sufficient to pass title of the truck to Russell V. Anderson. 
Walker's claim must fail by reason of the fact that he failed to 
abide by the Statutes of the State of Utah in transferring title 
to a motor vehicle* If Walker's purported transfer was not valid 
then Walker's only claim of error would be that the truck was 
exempt from execution. Walker's own letters admit possession of 
more than one vehicle, and, therefore, the truck in question could 
not be claimed under the exemption. Therefore, regardless of 
whether the court construes the levy of taking place on June 24th 
on or July 17th, the levy in fact preceded a legal change of 
ownership and Walker was not denied the use of a vehicle as he 
still retained ownership of a Jeep Cherokee. 
Walker's appeal fails to address issues framed in the 
"Crossclaim" Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The only issue here 
addressed is the propriety of the Credit Bureau's levy of execu-
tion upon a truck. 
The issues of Willmore's and Preston's liability to Walker 
not being addressed it must be concluded that the dismissal 
entered by the District Court is not being appealed from. (Walker 
failed to file a docketing statement giving notice to the 
contrary). Viewing the evidence most favorable to the 
"Crossclaimant" the Trial Court did not commit error and the 
judgment of the Trial Court should be sustained. 
RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this /d day of March, 1986. 
HARRIS, PRESTON, GUTKE & CHAMBERS 
B. H. Harris, 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Respondents 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIEF, to the Defendant, Cross 
Claimant and Appellant, Ralph L. Walker, P. 0. Box 254, Bountiful, 
Utah 84010, and to the Plaintiff's Attorney, Gordon Low, 175 East 
100 North, Logan, Utah 84321, on this /& day of March, 1986. 
B* H. Harris 
UTAH CODE 
19*3-1986 Motor Vehicles 41-1-73 
41-1-64. New owner to secure transfer of registration and 
sew certificate of title. 
41-1-^5 through 41-1-66. Repealed. 
41-1-67. Transfer by operation of law. 
41-1-63. New owner may register or upon transfer execute 
an assignment. 
41-1-69. Repealed. 
41-1*70. Repealed. 
41-1-71. When department to transfer and issue new certi-
ficate - Records of certificates and applications. 
41*1-72. Necessary before transfer complete. 
41-1-73. Manufacturer or dealer to give notice of sale or 
transfer. 
41-1-74. Assignment by Hen holder. 
41-1-75. Release by lien holder to owner. 
41-1-76. Failure to endorse and deliver certificate a misde-
41-1-77. Owner not liable for negligent operation after 
'transfer. 
41-1-73. Permit required to dismantle motor vehicle. 
41-1-79. Use of dismantling permit • Sale or transfer of 
vehicle - Rebuilt vehicles. 
41-1-79.5. Abandoned and inoperable vehicles • Determin-
ation by commission • Disposal of vehicles. 
41-1-62. Transfer by owner. 
Whenever the owner of a registered vehicle 
transfers or assigns his title, or interest, thereto, the 
registration of said vehicle shall expire. 
The owner shall remove the registration plates 
therefrom and within twenty days from the date of 
transfer shall forward the same to the department 
to be destroyed or may have such plates and the 
registration number thereon assigned to another 
vehicle upon the payment of the transfer fee 
provided by law and subject to the rules and regul-
ations of the department. 1957 
41-1-63. Endorsement of assignment and warranty 
of tide. 
The owner shall endorse an assignment and 
warranty of title upon the valid certificate of title 
issued for such vehicle by the State of Utah or other 
state or country. Said endorsement and assignment 
shall include a statement of all liens or encumbran-
ces thereto, and shall be verified under oath by the 
owner before a notary public or other person auth-
orized by law to administer oaths, and he shall 
deliver the valid certificate of title and certificate of 
registration to the purchaser or transferee at the 
time of delivering the vehicle, or within 48 hours 
thereof, except as provided for under section 41-3-
2 . 1979 
41-1-64. New owner to secure transfer of registrat-
ion and new certificate of title. 
The transferee before operating or permitting the 
operation of such vehicle on a highway shall present 
to the department the certificate of registration and 
the certificate of title, properly endorsed, and shall 
apply for and obtain a new certificate of title for 
said vehicle and a new registration therefor, as upon 
an original registration, except as permitted to [in] 
sections 41-1-65 and 41-1-67. 1963 
41-1-65 through 41-1-66. Repealed. 1965 
41-1-67. Transfer by operation of law. 
Whenever the title or interest of an owner in or 
to a registered vehicle shall pass to another, 
otherwise than by voluntary transfer, the registrat-
ion thereof shall expire and the vehicle shall not be 
operated upon a highway unless and until the 
person entitled to possession of such vehicle shall 
apply for and obtain the registration thereof, except 
that the vehicle may be operated by the person 
1915 
1977 
entitled to its possession or his legal representative 
upon the highways for a distance not exceeding se-
venty-five miles upon displaying on such vehicle the 
registration plates issued to the former owner, or in 
the event title has become vested in a person 
holding a lien or encumbrance on such vehicle, such 
person may apply to the department for and obtain 
special plates as may be issued under this act to 
dealers and may operate any said repossessed 
vehicle under such special plate only for the 
purposes of transporting the same to a garage or 
warehouse or in demonstrating or selling such 
vehicle. 1953 
41-1-68. New owner may register or upon transfer 
execute an assignment. 
Upon amy such transfer a new owner may either 
secure a new registration and certificate of title on 
proper application, upon presentation of such instr-
uments or documents of authority or certified 
copies thereof as may be sufficient or required by 
law to evidence or effect a transfer of title oi 
interest in or to chattels in such case, or such new 
owner, upon transferring his title or interest to 
another person shall execute and acknowledge an 
assignment and warranty of title and deliver the 
same, also the documents of authority or certified 
copies i hereof as may be sufficient or required by 
law to evidence the right of such person, to the 
person to whom such transfer is made. 19S3 
41-1-69. Repealed. 
41-1-70. Repealed. 
41-1-71. When department to transfer and issue 
new certificate • Records of certificates and applic-
ations. 
The department upon receipt of a properly 
endorsed certificate of title and certificate of regist-
ration and proper application for registration, acc-
ompanied by the required fee and when satisfied as 
to the genuineness and regularity of such transfer 
and the right of the transferee to a certificate of 
title, shall reregister the vehicle as upon a new regi-
stration in the name of the new owner and issue a 
new certificate of registration and a certificate of 
title as upon an original application. 
The department shall retain and appropriately file 
every surrendered certificate of title and every appl-
ication for title for a period of not less than five 
years, such file to be so maintained as to permit the 
tracing of title of the vehicles designated therein. A 
microfilmed copy of a departmental record, accom-
panied by certification, shall be admissible in any 
court in like manner as the original document. 1963 
41-1-72. Necessary before transfer complete. 
Until the department shall have issued such new 
certificate of registration and certificate of owners-
hip, delivery of any vehicle required to be registered 
shall be deemed not to have been made and title 
thereto shall be deemed not to have passed, and 
said intended transfer shall be deemed to be incom-
plete and not to be valid or effective for any 
purpose except as provided in section 41-1-77. 19S3 
41-1-73. Manufacturer or dealer to give notke of 
sale or transfer. 
Every manufacturer or dealer upon transferring a 
vehicle of a type subject to registration hereunder, 
whether by sale, lease or otherwise, to any person 
other than a manufacturer or dealer, shall immedi-
ately give written notice of such transfer to the de-
CODE»CO 
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BILL OF SALE 
.v' In consideration of 
/ / / / LA \/d^^^^ 
i^.M^r^M^sDoiiars 
is hereby acknowledged, ($//! ), receipt of which w _ . the undersigned, herei^ i referred to as seller, hereby nells 
and delivers to /£oU4<M U>^U^ccui^ the following described automobile 
Make
 m Eo&V lL " ^ fScJtuf 
Identification or ' 
Engine Number 
Serial Number 
Bo 
Year Manufactured liKdLm ^ ^^^^ 
Model Number f*/en> " 
Seller hereby warrants that he is the legal owner 
of such automobile, that it is free froip all liens/and 
cumbrances ^ ^ except &?*hyAjeAjitd£<x^ 
that he has the right to sell the same7 andthat he will 
warrant and defend the title thereof against the claims and 
demands of^11 persons except the 
Dated U/Xf/oe . 1985. 
Judd Preston, Attorney 
Harris, Preston, Gutke & Chambers 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, UT 84321 
Dear Mr. Preston: 
and 
same 
that 
with 
In regards to the case with The Herald Journal andunly&ierf 
Steve Brown, I am in at least ten other complaints^ OT the 
nature with Mr. Brown. The reason I fought the case is 
I wanted to know how the judge would rule on the relationship' 
myself and Mr. Brown. 
I believe Mr. Brown to be liable for all of the cases that 
I am presently being sued on and that I would be unable to collect* 
anything if I sued Mr. Brown. Because of this situation, I 
must either make a settlement with all of the plaintiffs or 
file for protection under one of the various chapters of the 
bankruptcy code. I therefore make you this offer: 
1) That I sign a note with the Credit Bureau for $624.26 
to be paid in monthly installments over the next 24 months toget 
with 10% interest payments of $28.81. 
2) That the Credit Bureau release the judgment from th^. 
record so that I may continue in business without the judgment. Y/ 
I would agree to a stipulation to the above which would not ^ 
require a complete new trial to collect. y 
3) All of the above is subject to other parties settling^ 
on reasonable terms and interest rates provided that other creditors 
may extend for longer periods for amounts over $10,000. 
Please discuss the above with your client and let me kn 
if this would be acceptable. 
Sincerely, 
Ralph L. Walker, CCIM 
RLW/pb 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RVA REALTORS, aka RVA SERVICES 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
RALPH L. WALKER and MARSHA M. 
WALKER, 
Defendant 
RALPH L. WALKER and MARSHA M. 
WALKER, 
Cross-Claimant, 
v. 
GEORGE PRESTON, THOMAS WILLMORE, 
and CREDIT BUREAU OF LOGAN, 
Cross-Claim Defendants 
Motions have been filed on behalf of George Preston, Thomas 
Willmore, and the Credit Bureau of Logan, and a Motion to Dismiss 
the Crossclaim of Defendant, Ralph L. Walker and Marsha M. Walker. 
The Motion to Dismiss is based on a valid execution after 
judgment on a certain truck. The crossclaim is based on allegations 
it is a wrongful execution since it has been sold to another party. 
It has been sold to another party but in the defendant's response 
it is noted that the bill of sale was made after the Sheriff had 
levied on the truck. Nothing in the record that would indicate 
there was any procedural errors in the execution. 
Therefore, the Motions are granted. Cousel for Preston, Willmore, 
and the Credit Bureau to prepare the appropriate orders and 
the matter remanded back to the Circuit Court for trial 
original complaint. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 23305 
RVA Realtors v. Ralph L. Walker 
Civil #23305 
Page Two 
Dated this 5th day of December, 19 85, 
BY THE COURT: 
reNOW tafr is£&f£ e rsen 
D i s t r i c t iludge 
; o J ho above ma!!; J i o 
Ralph Lv Walker - 135S~Lak«--V±ew Drr - Bount i fu l , Utah 84010 
B, H, Harris 31 Federal TW^'^-'Toganf Utah 84321 
"
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HARRIS, PRESTON, GUTKE & CHAMBERS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RVA REALTORS, aka RVA SERVICES * 
CORPORATION 
* 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
* 
RALPH L. WALKER and MARSHA M. 
WALKER, * 
Defendants * 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 23305 
RALPH L. WALKER, * 
Cross Claimant, * 
vs. * 
GEORGE PRESTON, THOMAS WILLMORE * 
and CREDIT BUREAU OF LOGAN 
Cross Claim Defendants 
THIS Matter came on before the Court upon Cross Claim 
Defendants, George Preston, Thomas Willmore and Credit Bureau of 
Logan Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment and the Court 
having received and reviewed the Memorandum of the Cross Claim 
Defendants and the Memorandum of the Defendants, Ralph and Marsha 
Walker, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Cross Claim Defendant, Credit Bureau of Logan, 
obtained a Judgment in the amount of $1,886.00, against the 
Defendant, Ralph L. Walker and Century 21 Realty Services on the 
2nd day of May, 1985, in the Second Circuit Court, State of Utah, 
County of Cache, Logan City Department. 
2. That pursuant to the execution and upon the precipe of 
the Credit Bureau of Logan, the Circuit Court issued a Writ of 
Execution directed to the Sheriff of Cache County. The Writ of 
Execution was valid and directed the Sheriff of Cache County to 
levy upon a Ford pickup truck titled in the name of the Defendant 
Ralph L. Walker. 
3. On the 24th day of June, 1985, the Sheriff of Cache 
County levied upon the Ford pickup truck titled in the Defendant, 
Ralph L. Walker's name. 
4. Defendants' response concedes that the Bill of Sale was 
made after the Sheriff had levied on the truck and by reason 
thereof the Sheriff's levy was a lawful and valid levy upon the 
property of the Defendant, Ralph L. Walker. 
5. That the sale of the truck pursuant to the levy of execu-
tion was conducted by the Sheriff in accordance with the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
6. There is no material issue of fact in this case. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
RRIS.PRESTON, 1. That the Credit Bureau of Logan has a valid judgment 
KE & CHAMBERS 
ORNEYS-AT-LAW 
EOERALAVENUE a g a i n s t t h e D e f e n d a n t , R a l p h L . W a l k e r . 
GAN. UTAH 84321 <A1 
2. That the Second Circuit Courtf Logan City Department 
issued a valid execution upon the judgment of the Credit Bureau of 
Logan directing the Sheriff to levy upon a Ford pickup truck owned 
by the Defendant, Ralph L. Walker. 
3. That the Sheriff of Cache County's levy upon the Ford 
truck was lawful and in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
4. That by virtue of the levy of execution upon the truck 
the Defendant Ralph L. Walker was not denied a property right, nor 
has been no interference with any contractual relations between 
the Defendant Ralph L. Walker and RVA Realtors. 
5. That the Defendant Ralph L. Walker has asserted no valid 
causes of action against the Cross Claim Defendants as there is 
nothing in the record that would indicate there was any procedural 
errors in the execution. 
7. That judgment should enter accordingly. 
DATED this day of December, 1985. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
m 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to 
Ralph L. Walker at 1355 Lakeview Drive, Bountiful, Utah 84010, on 
this day of December, 1985. 
B« H. Harris 
B. H. Harris 1381 
HARRIS, PRESTON, GUTKE & CHAMBERS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RVA REALTORS, aka RVA SERVICES 
CORPORATION 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RALPH L. WALKER and MARSHA M. 
WALKER, 
Defendants 
RALPH L. WALKER, 
Cross Claimant, 
GEORGE PRESTON, THOMAS WILLMORE * 
and CREDIT BUREAU OF LOGAN 
* 
Cross Claim Defendants 
THIS Matter came on before the Court on the 5th day of 
December, 1985, upon the motion of the Cross Claim Defendants to 
dismiss the cross complaint of Ralph L. Walker and Marsha M. 
Walker, and the Court having reviewed the motion and memorandums 
of the Cross Claim Defendants and the replies thereto by Cross 
Claimants Ralph L. Walker and Marsha M. Walker, and the Court 
having found that there is no material issue of fact between the 
Ice 
* 
* 
* J U D G M E N T 
* 
C i v i l No. 23305 
parties and having taken the matter into advisement and having 
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it 
is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. That the Cross Claim of the Defendants, Ralph L. and 
Marsha M. Walker against George Preston, Thomas Willmore and 
Credit Bureau of Logan, dated the 19th day of October, 1985, is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
2. The above entitled matter is hereby remanded back to the 
Circuit Court for trial upon the complaint of Plaintiff RVA 
Realtors v. Ralph L. Walker and Marsha M. Walker. 
DATED this day of December, 1985. 
CIRCUIT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing JUDGMENT to Ralph L. Walker at 1355 Lakeview 
Drive, Bountiful, Utah 84010, on this day of December, 1985. 
B. H. Harris 
/ C f 
